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USING THEORY IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE EVALUATION 
 
Brad Astbury 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter examines the nature and role of theory in criminal justice 
evaluation. A distinction between theories of and theories for evaluation is 
offered to clarify what is meant by ‘theory’ in the context of contemporary 
evaluation practice. Theories of evaluation provide a set of prescriptions and 
principles that can be used to guide the design, conduct and use of evaluation. 
Theories for evaluation include programme theory and the application of social 
science theory to understand how and why criminal justice interventions work 
to generate desired outcomes. The fundamental features of these three types 
of theory are discussed in detail, with a particular focus on demonstrating their 
combined value and utility for informing and improving the practice of criminal 
justice evaluation. 
 
Criminal justice evaluators are confronted with a myriad of choices: What 
is the purpose of the evaluation? What are the key evaluation questions? 
What is the most appropriate design for the study? What methods should 
be employed? What role should I play in this evaluation? Which 
stakeholders should be involved? What should be done to ensure that the 
results are used? What about the legal, political and ethical challenges 
that may arise? The way in which evaluators respond to these kinds of 
questions seems to depend largely on particular features of the evaluation 
context, the information needs of decision-makers, as well as the tacit 
knowledge and experience of the evaluator. 
 
There appears, though, to be little discussion regarding roles for ‘theory’ 
in criminal justice evaluation practice. There has been some debate 
among academic criminologists in Australia and the United Kingdom about 
political and methodological dimensions of evaluation work and some of 
this does touch on issues related to theory (see Farrington, 2003; Hope, 
2004; Israel, 2000; Walters, 2003; Weatherburn, 2005). However, explicit 
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consideration of the nature and functions of theory in criminal justice 
evaluation is rare. This could be one of the reasons why some 
criminologists claim that evaluation research is unreliable, ‘lacks academic 
rigour’ and has been corrupted by commercialism and political inﬂuence 
(Travers, 2005, p. 39; White, 2001). A renewed emphasis on theory may 
go some way towards promoting a more positive image of criminal justice 
evaluation. 
 
A major aim of this chapter is to unpack the relationship between theory 
and evaluation practice, and in doing so demonstrate how and why theory 
matters for practice. I begin by outlining brieﬂy some of the reasons why 
evaluation research appears to have adopted a primarily method-driven, a 
theoretical orientation. Next I attempt to clarify what is meant by ‘theory’ 
in the context of contemporary evaluation practice by distinguishing 
between theories of and theories for evaluation. Theories of evaluation 
fall into the domain of what is commonly referred to as evaluation theory. 
Theories for evaluation include programme theory and the application of 
substantive social science theory to understand how and why criminal 
justice programmes work to generate desired outcomes. The central 
features of these various kinds of ‘practising theory’ are discussed in turn, 
with particular emphasis on demonstrating the role each type of theory 
can play in guiding the conduct of criminal justice evaluation. 
 
 
HISTORICAL NEGLECT OF THEORY IN EVALUATION 
 
The traditional neglect of theory in evaluation practice can be viewed, in 
the main, as a by-product of the historical development of programme 
evaluation (Chen, 1990). Compared to many other areas of social science, 
programme evaluation is still a relatively young discipline. Although 
systematic evaluation, particularly in the ﬁeld of education and curriculum 
assessment, had already been advanced to some extent in the 1930s and 
1940s by scholars such as Ralph Tyler it was not until after World War II 
that evaluation experienced a significant boom. Under the Kennedy and 
Johnson Administrations of the late 1960s and 1970s social scientists from 
a variety of disciplinary backgrounds were called upon to conduct 
programme and policy evaluations of large-scale federal reforms. 
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Researchers studiously applied their analytical and technical skills to the 
‘rational’ assessment of hundreds of new interventions designed to 
alleviate poverty and improve the human condition. 
 
The general mood at this time was, in hindsight, overly optimistic and 
perhaps even a little naıve. It was widely believed that through solemn 
application of sound social science methodology, policy-makers would be 
able to identify and expand effective social programmes, while at the 
same time terminating and discarding programmes that did not work. 
However, distinguishing between programmes that failed because they 
were a bad idea and those that failed because of poor implementation 
proved to be much more difficult than anticipated. When clear results 
were available, many evaluators assumed that politicians and 
stakeholders, who had funded their work, would eagerly apply findings 
and recommendations. Experience soon revealed that direct, instrumental 
use of evaluation findings is frequently an exception rather than the norm. 
 
Since that time, much has been learnt. While programme evaluation is still 
primarily a practice-driven field, it is also fair to say that it is becoming 
more sophisticated and theoretically mature (Shadish, 1998). Evaluation is 
starting to ‘crystallize and emerge as a distinct profession’ with its own 
unique and rich language, theories and logic of practice (Stufflebeam & 
Shinkfield, 2007, p. 41). Over the past two decades the number of articles 
and books about evaluation has grown dramatically, as has the number of 
professional evaluation societies. Significant developments in evaluation 
theory, methodology and practice continue to occur as the field addresses 
new challenges and becomes increasingly global in orientation. 
 
However, advances in the theoretical knowledge base of programme 
evaluation appear to have had a negligible impact on how evaluation is 
practised in the field (Christie, 2003; Shadish & Epstein, 1987; Smith, 
1993). This is particularly so in many of the disciplinary areas where 
evaluations are regularly conducted. For example, in medicine the term 
‘evaluation’ is often still synonymous with experimental impact studies. In 
psychology, education, health promotion and criminology, where a 
stronger interdisciplinary focus exists, a broader conception of evaluation 
is generally encouraged. Nonetheless, the extent to which knowledge of 
evaluation theory is communicated within and across disciplines appears 
to be limited. Although the reasons are likely to be varied,1 ‘it is hard to 
argue that this low level of familiarity with theory is desirable, if for no 
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other reason than the fact that evaluators are deprived of knowledge of 
options they have available to use in their practice’ (Shadish & Epstein, 
1987, p. 586). 
 
 
THE MEANING AND USES OF THEORY IN EVALUATION 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of theory in the natural or 
social sciences. Depending on the particular field of knowledge and 
context in which it is used, the term can mean different things. There are 
important consequences of this for the field of evaluation. The American 
sociologist Robert Merton, who devoted much of his career to advancing 
the role of theory in social science, describes the problem as follows:  
 
Like so many words that are bandied about, the word ‘theory’ threatens to 
become meaningless. Because its referents are so diverse – including 
everything from minor working hypothesis, through comprehensive but vague 
and unordered speculations, to axiomatic systems of thought – use of the word 
often obscures rather than creates understanding. (1967, p. 39) 
 
In light of these cautions it is important from the outset to be clear about 
what is meant by the rather abstract notion of ‘theory’ and to identify its 
various applications in evaluation. While it has been recognised for some 
time that evaluators make use of various kinds of theory in their work, 
Donaldson and Lipsey (2006) were perhaps the first to clarify some of the 
different meanings of theory in the context of contemporary evaluation 
practice. They make a useful distinction between three common forms of 
theory encountered in evaluation: 
 
1. Evaluation theory 
2. Programme theory 
3. Social science theory 
 
The first form of theory is best understood as a theory of evaluation 
because it offers a set of prescriptions about what constitutes ‘good’ 
evaluation practice. Programme theory and social science theory can be 
viewed as theories for evaluation in that they provide a methodology for 
understanding how and why programmes bring about change. Of course, 
the boundaries between these three forms of theory are blurry.2 
Nevertheless, the distinction is helpful because it provides some 
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conceptual clarity regarding the nature and role of theory in evaluation 
practice. 
 
 
THEORIES OF EVALUATION 
 
Theories of evaluation attempt to provide a coherent set of principles to 
guide the study and practice of programme evaluation (Alkin, 2004). 
According to Shadish, Cook, and Leviton (1991), there are five main 
components of evaluation theory. These can be summarised briefly as 
follows: 
 
1. Social programming: the nature, internal structure and functioning of 
social programmes particularly with respect to their role in ameliorating 
social problems. 
 
2. Knowledge construction: philosophical assumptions about the nature of 
knowledge (epistemology), the nature of reality (ontology) and methods 
used to generate ‘credible’ knowledge about social programmes. 
 
3. Valuing: the nature and role that various kinds of values play in the 
evaluation of social programmes. 
 
4. Knowledge use: the ways social science information is used to modify 
programmes and policies and what evaluators can do to increase use. 
 
5. Evaluation practice: the role of evaluators, the relationship they form 
with programme stakeholders and the tactics and strategies evaluators 
use in their professional work; especially given the constraints of time, 
money and expertise. 
 
There is no single or ideal theory of evaluation. Evaluation theorists differ 
considerably in their conceptualisation of the five components of 
evaluation theory identified above. This has led to a vast (and now almost 
overwhelming) array of programme evaluation theories that are known 
more widely as ‘models’, ‘approaches’, ‘types’ or ‘forms’ of evaluation. 
Newcomers to the field of evaluation in the 1970s could perhaps be 
content with understanding the basic distinction between formative and 
summative evaluation approaches (see Scriven, 1967 and below for more 
detail). Today the novice evaluator faces a much more difficult prospect of 
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sorting through dozens of competing models of evaluation. One recent 
attempt at classification, for example, identified 26 alternative evaluation 
models (Stufflebeam & Shinkfield, 2007). 
 
Table 1 provides a select overview of several well-known and some not so 
well-known evaluation theories and theorists. The list is certainly not 
exhaustive, but is intended to demonstrate the depth and variety of 
theoretical influences on contemporary evaluation practice. 
 
The diversity of evaluation theory is partly due to the influence that 
different philosophical orientations have had on the nature and 
development of intellectual thinking in evaluation. During the mid to late 
1980s, evaluation, like many disciplines, experienced a heated debate 
between two prevailing perspectives or paradigms. These two paradigms 
have been labelled in various ways but most typically are referred to as 
‘positivism’ and ‘constructivism’. The ‘paradigm wars’ have been fought 
vigorously across many key areas in the philosophy of social science, such 
as: the nature of reality (ontology); the nature of knowledge 
(epistemology); the role of values in inquiry (axiology); the possibility of 
causal linkages; and the ability to establish generalisations (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1981, 1989). 
 
Traditionally, experimental and quasi-experimental theories of evaluation 
have dominated mainstream evaluation practice, providing a 
methodological template for how to do evaluation (e.g. Campbell & 
Stanley, 1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979). Experimentalism has historical 
roots in a positivist philosophy of social science. Briefly stated, this 
position maintains that evaluators should approach the study of social 
programmes in roughly the same way that the physical sciences such as 
physics and chemistry approach the study of natural phenomena (Martin 
& McIntyre, 1994). 
 
Experimental evaluation follows a standard logic – construct two 
equivalent groups and undertake a ‘before’ measurement, then apply the 
intervention to only one of the two groups and then take an ‘after’ 
measurement. Any difference or change from first to second 
measurement in the intervention (experimental/treatment) group 
compared to the non-intervention (control) group is deemed to be 
attributable to the intervention. When cases are randomly assigned to 
each of the two groups, this research design is referred to as a randomised 
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control trial (RCT) or ‘true experiment’. When non-random methods are 
used to create experimental and control groups, or where a control group 
is absent the design is referred to as a ‘quasi-experiment’. 
Over the past three decades the orthodoxy of the experimental approach 
has been challenged by the development of anti-naturalist approaches to 
evaluation, such as: responsive evaluation (Stake, 1983); fourth-
generation evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989); and empowerment 
evaluation (Fetterman, 1996). 
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These are based, to varying degrees, on constructivist philosophies of 
social science. This position holds the view that evaluators should not 
investigate social programmes in the same way as natural scientists study 
nature. The basic argument is a follows: people construct their own 
subjective reality of social programmes through complex processes of 
human interaction. As a consequence, knowledge about social 
programmes cannot exist external to human interactions which occur in 
specific contexts, spaces and times. 
 
It is difficult to summarise the design ‘logic’ of constructivist evaluation, as 
there are many different approaches that fit broadly into the constructive 
camp. At a fundamental level though, there is usually a tendency to 
employ qualitative approaches such as case studies, in-depth interviewing 
and prolonged periods of field observation. This is deemed necessary to 
understand the complexity and richness of human interactions that occur 
between various programme stakeholders. Constructivist evaluators also 
tend to adopt a ‘negotiator’ role, work closely with stakeholders to 
facilitate consensus among multiple interpretations of the programme 
(see Guba & Lincoln, 1989). 
 
 
The Evolution of Evaluation Theory 
 
The emphasis placed on the five components of evaluation theory has 
changed over time. Early developments in evaluation theory focused 
primarily on knowledge construction and valuing (see the work of Donald 
Campbell and Michael Scriven). In the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s conceptual development turned to theories of use and strategies 
for responding to the needs of policy-makers (e.g. Carol Weiss, Joseph 
Wholey and Robert Stake). Evaluation theorists such as Peter Rossi and 
Lee Cronbach then tried to integrate the work of previous scholars into 
tailored, systematic evaluation approaches (Shadish et al., 1991). 
 
Over the past decade there have been some notable attempts to further 
consolidate different perspectives on evaluation. For example, Mark, 
Henry, and Julnes (2000) present a coherent and practical theory of 
evaluation, grounded in an emergent realist philosophy of science. They 
offer a useful distinction between four key purposes of programme 
evaluation. These are: (1) to assess the merit and worth of programmes; 
(2) to ensure programme compliance with regulatory mandates, (3) to 
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improve programmes and organisations; and (4) to build theoretical 
knowledge and cumulate evidence for future programmes. They also 
identify four modes of evaluative inquiry: description, classification, causal 
analysis and values inquiry. For practitioners, this integrative framework 
can guide decisions regarding the most appropriate evaluation approach 
and methods, given specific circumstances and constraints. 
 
As the field of evaluation continues to grow there has also been a 
noticeable rise in the number evaluation ‘textbooks’, as well as new 
journals, encyclopaedias and handbooks targeted specifically at 
professional evaluators. In 1972 Carol Weiss published one of the very 
first evaluation textbooks, and in 1976 the first journal, Evaluation Review, 
was launched by Sage Publications. Today there are over a dozen 
dedicated evaluation journals that publish scholarly articles reporting on 
evaluation studies, evaluation methods, theory, use, values and 
philosophy. 
 
Another indication of growth is the worldwide expansion of professional 
evaluation associations. In 1980 there were only three regional or national 
evaluation societies. This grew to nine by the late 1990s and just one 
decade later there were more than 50 professional evaluation societies. 
Today, there are over 125 societies and a global network, the 
International Organisation for Cooperation in Evaluation, has been 
established to build evaluation capacity and foster the exchange of ideas, 
practices and insights (http://ioce.net/index.shtml). 
 
These trends and developments suggest that evaluation is becoming much 
more commonplace in modern democracies as well as in developing 
countries. We are now experiencing what might be called a ‘Second 
Boom’ period in evaluation (Donaldson & Lipsey, 2006). The idealism and 
heated debates associated with philosophical prescriptions of the past 
have been tempered by a growing acceptance of the complementary roles 
that different forms of data can play in evaluation research. A planned 
eclecticism of approach holds sway. Today’s evaluation practitioner 
typically adopts a pragmatic stance; mixing-methods and tailoring the 
evaluation to meet the needs of intended users. 
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Roles for Evaluation Theory in Criminal Justice 
 
Having outlined, very briefly, the nature and evolution of evaluation 
theory one might ask, why is evaluation theory worth knowing? One way 
of answering this is to consider the relationship between evaluation 
theory and methodology. No single research design, methodology or 
method of data collection is appropriate always and everywhere. Strict 
adherence to one approach is likely to result in data that is of little use. It 
may also lead to inaccurate conclusions about the merit or worth of the 
programme or policy that is being evaluated. The decline of the 
rehabilitative ideal following Martinson’s (1974) now infamous review of 
231 quasiexperimental evaluations of offender treatment studies is an 
instructive example of how the methodological ‘law of the hammer3 
‘approach to evaluation can dangerously misinform judgements regarding 
programme effectiveness. Shadish et al. (1991) explain that knowledge of 
evaluation theory encourages appreciation of the range of methods and 
techniques that can be employed by practising evaluators. Most 
importantly though, it provides guiding principles for their application 
across the range of scenarios that criminal justice evaluators are 
confronted with: 
 
Evaluation theories are like military strategies and tactics; methods are like 
military weapons and logistics. The good commander needs to know strategy and 
tactics to deploy weapons properly or to organise logistics in different situations. 
The good evaluator needs theories for the same reasons in choosing and 
deploying methods. Without thorough grounding in evaluation theory, the 
evaluator is left to trial and error or to professional lore in learning about 
appropriate methods. (p. 34) 
 
In a similar vein, Stufflebeam and Shinkfield (2007) remind us that 
evaluation theory is worth knowing because poor theories of evaluation 
can mislead evaluation practice, resulting in serious negative 
consequences. They use as an example, the development of objectives-
based evaluation theory. This approach was developed by Ralph Tyler in 
the 1930s, and grew out of his work on the effects of large-scale 
educational innovation. Objective- or goal-based evaluation narrowly 
defines the purpose of evaluation as the process of determining whether 
or not a programme has achieved specified outcomes. This ‘theory’ of 
evaluation misled evaluators for decades as there was a strong tendency 
to focus only on intended outcomes, not on the actual outcomes (positive 
or negative) that a particular programme might be generating. 
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Another informative case-in-point comes from the area of evaluation 
commonly referred to as performance measurement or monitoring 
(Wholey, 2001). Performance data typically comes in the form of 
quantitative output measures such as: number of offenders enrolled in a 
programme; percentage of programme completions; crime ‘clearance’ 
rates, recidivism rates and so on. Criminal justice administrators regularly 
develop and use ‘indicators’ such as these to track implementation and 
measure programme impact over time. The application of a measurement 
or indicator-based approach to evaluation can, however, alter the delivery 
of an intervention in destructive ways. In the evaluation theory literature 
this phenomena is commonly referred to as ‘Campbell’s Law’ of goal 
displacement: 
 
The more any quantitative indicator is used for social decision-making, the 
more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to 
distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor. (Campbell, 
1979, p. 85)  
 
Consider, for example, the commonly used ‘number and rate of 
completion’ measure for correctional programmes. In many jurisdictions 
new initiatives have been introduced far too rapidly, resulting in perverse 
effects. In one study, Raynor (2004) found that the three-year time frame 
for implementing offender programmes in probation agencies across 
England and Wales was not realistic. Pressure from government and 
Treasury officials to introduce change quickly occurred mainly as a result 
of unreasonable targets for programme completions. These targets ‘drove 
the pace of the roll-out of offending programs’ but were established 
‘without any systematic prior assessment of the characteristics of 
offenders under supervision and their suitability for programmes’ (p. 316). 
 
Aside from wasting time and resources, the presence of an unenthusiastic 
offender in a group programme could have a disruptive or harmful affect 
on other participants. Even the use of higher-order ‘outcome’ measures 
such as recidivism can undermine the intent of correctional programmes. 
Programme staff, for instance, may recruit lower-risk offenders to make a 
new programme appear more successful or to gain additional funding (a 
phenomena known as ‘creaming’). While it is difficult to prevent these 
kinds of scenarios from occurring altogether, prior knowledge of relevant 
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evaluation theory can assist evaluation practitioners to minimise the 
dysfunctional side-effects of quantitative performance measures. 
 
The benefit of understanding evaluation theory can be demonstrated 
further through a final illustration. Scriven (1967) first distinguished 
between the formative and summative roles of evaluation. Formative 
evaluation asks the question ‘How are we doing?’ It focuses on generating 
information about programme processes and implementation. This 
information is then used primarily by internal staff to inform decisions 
about programme development and improvement. Summative evaluation 
asks the question ‘How have we done?’ It focuses on generating evidence 
about the worth of the programme in terms of outcomes and ultimate 
impact of the intervention. Summative evaluation is typically conducted 
after a programme has had time to settle and mature, and often informs 
decisions concerning programme continuation, termination, expansion, 
replication and so on. 
 
The formative–summative typology, although a simplification of reality, is 
now almost universally accepted in the field and has been instrumental in 
shaping the way people think about evaluation. Evaluators who lack an 
understanding of the importance of tailoring an evaluation to the stage of 
programme development may fall into the trap of conducting a 
summative evaluation too soon. In the socio-political context of criminal 
justice programming this can be problematic. For example, where an 
experimental study conducted on a poorly implemented programme leads 
to findings of ‘no effect’, this may result in the premature termination of a 
potentially effective intervention. 
 
To conclude, evaluation theory serves several purposes. Perhaps most 
critically, it functions as a guide to practice. It does this in many ways: by 
informing decisions about when and why to use particular models of 
evaluation and methods of data collection; by steering evaluators away 
from narrow or faulty conceptions of what evaluation is and how it should 
be conducted; and by directing the practising evaluator to common issues, 
problems and challenges that are likely to arise in particular evaluation 
contexts. 
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THEORIES FOR EVALUATION 
 
This section introduces two further notions of theory, which can also be 
incorporated usefully into the practice of criminal justice evaluation. 
These two types of theory are referred to here as programme theory and 
social science theory. Both can be considered theories for evaluation 
because they provide the evaluator with a powerful way of understanding 
how and why social programmes generate outcomes. This is somewhat 
different from a theory of evaluation, which as we have seen, focuses on 
the body of principles, prescriptions and ideas about how to conduct 
evaluations. 
 
Programme Theory 
 
Many discussions of programme theory seem to imply that it is a new 
approach – something which has only recently been discovered by the 
evaluation community. In fact, the concept of ‘programme theory’ has a 
relatively long lineage, particularly when one considers the short history of 
the field of evaluation. The roots of theory-driven evaluation can be 
traced back to the work of Edward Suchman, who in his 1967 book 
Evaluative Research, was perhaps the first evaluator to argue for the 
importance of investigating a programme’s implicit theory of action (at 
the time he referred to it as a programme’s ‘chain of objectives’). 
Importantly, Suchman suggested that one of the primary purposes of 
evaluation is ‘testing’ a programme hypothesis: 
 
The evaluation study tests some hypothesis that activity A will attain 
objective B because it is able to influence process C which affects the 
occurrence of this objective. An understanding of all three factors – 
program, objective and intervening process – is essential to the conduct of 
evaluative research. (p. 177) 
 
Perhaps because of Suchman’s untimely death shortly after the 
publication of his book, the importance of focusing evaluation on the 
theory underlying the action of social programmes was not recognised 
fully until some years later. Subsequently, evaluation theorists such as 
Carol Weiss (1972, 1997), Joseph Wholey (1979, 1987), and, in particular, 
Peter Rossi’s student Huey-Tsyh Chen (1990, 2005), have all helped to 
establish the prominence of programme theory. 
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There are some important differences in the various approaches to 
programme theory-based evaluation, but the common underlying theme 
is that programmes are theories. That is, all social programmes contain an 
assumption (or more likely a set of assumptions) about how and why 
programme resources and activities will bring about change in the 
reasoning and behaviour of participants. In this sense, programmes are 
not ‘dosages’ given to passive recipients; they are active interventions that 
only ‘work’ if people choose to make them work and are placed in the 
right conditions to enable them to do so’ (Pawson & Tilley, 1994, p. 294). 
 
Although there is currently no accepted definition, programme theory 
based evaluation has been usefully described by Bickman (1987) as ‘the 
construction of a plausible and sensible model of how a program is 
supposed to work’ with whom, how, why and under what circumstances 
(p. 5). This definition depicts nicely the idea that programme theories are 
best thought of as ‘small theories’ associated with specific social 
programmes, policies and interventions (Lipsey, 1993). 
 
Unfortunately, the term ‘programme theory’ all too often invokes images 
of some grand theory that attempts to account for the functioning of 
human behaviour in a law-like fashion. This image does not capture the 
kind of theorising that evaluators apply to the study of social programmes. 
Theory oriented evaluations are much more modest. This is one of the 
reasons why programme theories are often likened (after the sociologist 
Robert Merton) to middle-range theories which position themselves 
between universal social laws and description (Pawson, 2000). 
 
Programme theory can be expressed in many ways – a graphic 
display of boxes and arrows, a table, a narrative description and so 
on. The methodology for constructing programme theory, as well 
as the level of detail and complexity, also varies signiﬁcantly. Some 
examples include: path analysis and causal modelling; observations 
of the programme in action; interviews with staff to uncover 
implicit assumptions about how the programme works; concept 
mapping exercises; formal (argumentational) analyses of programme 
and policy documents; and detailed examination of research on 
similar programmes (Connell, Kubish, Schorr, & Weiss, 1995; 
Donaldson, 2007; Leeuw, 2003; Smith, 1990; Trochim, 1989). 
Regardless of the way it is developed and expressed, programme 
16 
 
theory should be grounded in the empirically realities of the 
particular programme, its implementation context, stafﬁng 
arrangements, funding levels and social and political environment. 
 
As well as helping to build knowledge about how and why further 
examples of the beneﬁts of programme theory for evaluation. For 
example, one early advocate of programme theory, Joseph Wholey 
(1983), used a form of programme theory known as ‘evaluability 
assessment’ in his work with the US government to determine 
whether or not a programme was ready to be evaluated. A good 
evaluability assessment can save considerable resources by 
forestalling a premature and potentially costly impact evaluation 
that would almost certainly yield biased estimates of programme 
effect. 
 
As interest in programme theory increased throughout the 1990s, 
evaluators also discovered the importance of programme theory for 
guiding evaluations and engaging stakeholders. For example, 
contributors to the New Directions for Evaluation compilation on 
programme theory (see Rogers, Hacsi, Petrosino, & Huebner, 2000) 
discuss the role of programme theory in formulating and prioritizing 
evaluation questions, directing data collection activities; and 
augmenting experimental evaluations and meta- analysis. Evaluators 
also report that the process of programme theory development can 
assist goal clariﬁcation, enhance stakeholder buy-in and provide 
information to improve programme design and delivery. 
 
It is common, however, to discover at the beginning of an evaluation 
that the theory of change underlying the programme has never been 
articulated or tested systematically. The programme theory or 
‘theories’ remain hidden, typically in the minds of policy architects 
and practitioners. Failure to surface assumptions about how 
programmes are ‘supposed to work’ can be problematic because if a 
programme is based on a faulty theory, then it will not bring about desired 
change, no matter how well it is implemented. 
 
Consider, for example, delinquency prevention programmes such as 
‘Scared Straight’. These programmes involve young people visiting prison 
to experience prison life firsthand. The purpose of these visits is usually 
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framed within the context of reducing crime and re-offending. A theory-
driven evaluation might start by asking: ‘What is it about exposure to 
prison life and prisoners that is supposed to help reduce crime and re-
offending? One of the (faulty) assumptions underlying ‘Scared Straight’ 
programmes is that criminal activity can be prevented by giving wayward 
teenagers a taste of what it would be like to be locked-up in prison. 
However, this hypothesis is not supported by evaluation findings which 
consistently demonstrate that programmes such as ‘Scared Straight’ 
appear to do more harm than good. For example, one comprehensive 
meta-analysis found that young people who complete these types of 
programmes have higher rates of re-offending than young people who do 
not go through the programme (Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, & Buehler, 
2003). It seems that despite considerable popularity and intuitive appeal 
‘attempts to scare teenagers into better behaviour [are] not a successful 
enterprise’ (McCord, 2003, p. 26). 
 
A theory-driven evaluation would dig further in an attempt to explain 
negative outcome patterns. Why is it that ‘Scared Straight’ programmes 
produce criminogenic effects? A quick survey of the literature suggests 
that a number of alternative programme theories seem to be at play. 
Consider the following three examples that may account for the harmful 
effects of ‘Scared Straight’ programmes: 
 
Alternative programme theory #1: Rather than ‘deterring’ crime, ‘Scared 
Straight’ programmes may inadvertently promote deviance among 
impressionable youths who view prisoners as positive (rather than 
negative) role models (Finckenauer, 1982). 
 
Alternative programme theory #2: Participants may react to attempts at 
intimidation by rising to the challenge and ‘proving’ to themselves, 
their peers and others that they are not scared of prison (Finckenauer, 
1982). 
 
Alternative programme theory #3: Delinquent-prone participants who may 
already feel alienated from society could form a belief that prison is a 
place of sanctuary where they can establish new friendships and derive a 
sense of belonging (Greater Egypt Planning & Development Commission, 
1979). 
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Of course, further investigation would likely reveal several additional, 
competing ‘Scared Straight’ programme theories. These would need to be 
teased out in a similar fashion and empirically tested using a variety of 
methods of data collection. The important point to emphasise is that 
programme theory-driven evaluations re-shift the focus of evaluation 
away from the view that programmes are molar treatments. According to 
the programme theory perspective, all programmes are based on a set of 
propositions regarding what goes on in the ‘black box’ to transform 
inputs into outcomes. Thus, when conducting programme theory 
evaluation, the theory or theories underlying programmes (even well-
established programmes with high levels of support) are an important 
focus for the evaluator’s scrutiny, not just observable programme effects. 
 
 
Social Science Theory 
 
A major task of the social sciences4 is to understand the nature, extent 
and causes of social problems. Of course, this is not the only task but it is 
arguably one of the most important. Theories of social problems are based 
on various kinds of observations, facts and events. When empirical data 
are packaged into a set of sensible, logical, and interrelated propositions, 
they form the basis for a verifiable and generalisable theory. Social science 
theories can be usefully defined as an attempt to explain ‘recurrent 
patterns or regularities in social life’ (Blaikie, 2009, p. 124). 
 
Social science theory is relevant for evaluators because programmes are 
planned efforts to solve social problems. Programmes ‘work’ by 
attempting to disrupt social regularities, altering the conditions, 
behaviours or processes that give rise to recurrent problems like crime, 
poverty, unemployment, poor educational achievement, substance 
misuse and so on. Although the evidence base for some social 
phenomenon is sparse, existing knowledge on prior efforts to prevent or 
solve social problems often exists. Of course, the knowledge base may not 
be directly applicable to a specific programme or evaluation, but 
‘operating within a vacuum when useful information exists, can be a very 
inefficient way to practice evaluation’ (Donaldson & Lipsey, 2006, p. 63). 
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In the context of criminal justice evaluation, there is an enormous variety 
of research and empirically based theories that programme planners and 
evaluations can usefully draw upon. For example, the conceptual basis for 
offending behaviour programmes is typically based on cognitive social 
learning theory (McGuire, 2006), and in the area of restorative justice and 
youth conferencing, Braithwaite’s (1989) theory of reintegrative shaming 
has been applied extensively. Tilley’s (1993) realistic evaluation of the way 
in which surveillance tactics, like closed-circuit television (CCTV), might 
influence (i.e. ‘block’) opportunities for criminal behaviour in and around 
car parks is a clear demonstration of how situational crime prevention 
theory can be instructive for evaluation.  
 
Social science theory also plays a critical role when evaluators are involved 
in assessing the need for a programme. Needs assessment is a 
fundamental stage of criminal justice evaluation ‘because a program 
cannot be effective at ameliorating a social problem if there is no problem 
to begin with or if the program services do not actually relate to the 
problem’ (Rossi, Lipsey, & Freeman, 2004, p. 102). The Australian 
criminologist Don Weatherburn provides an insightful critique of car-theft 
policy in Western Australia that highlights the importance of utilising 
existing research and theory, especially during needs assessment and 
programme design. 
 
Weatherburn (2004) explains that in the late 1980s, Western Australia 
was experiencing a significant rise in the number of officially recorded car 
thefts. In what was to become the first of two misguided policy responses, 
law enforcement officials decided to deal with the ‘problem’ by 
engaging in high speed pursuits of stolen cars. The consequences of this 
policy decision were disastrous (16 deaths during an 18-month period). 
The Labour Government then introduced severe penalties for repeat 
juvenile offenders to appease public reaction, which spuriously linked the 
problem of car theft to a lenient juvenile justice system. A subsequent 
evaluation revealed that the introduction of new punitive legislation had 
no effect on the rate of car theft in Western Australia. In a bid to win law 
and order votes politicians and policy-makers had misdiagnosed the 
nature of the problem. Weatherburn (2004) writes: 
 
The crowing irony is that the car theft problem in Western Australia was 
eventually brought under control, not as a result of tougher penalties, but 
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because a subsequent government passed a law requiring engine immobilisers 
to be fitted to all vehicles being registered [an example of situational crime 
prevention theory at work]. (p. 29) 
 
Another significant role for social science theory is to assist evaluators in 
the development of programme theory. As noted earlier, there are a 
variety of methods available for reconstructing programme theory. Many 
popular approaches utilise some form of visual ‘logic model’ to depict 
programme operations and outcomes. Typically the programme logic is 
based on information generated by some kind of elicitation technique, 
where the evaluator collaboratively develops the model with stakeholders 
(Leeuw, 2003). However, this does not mean that programme theories 
always need  to be based solely on practitioner wisdom, as stakeholder 
theories could in fact be wrong (as some of the above examples 
demonstrate). Where possible, programme theory should also incorporate 
information from previous research and knowledge of mechanisms 
derived from social and behavioural science (Astbury & Leeuw, 2010). 
 
From an evaluation perspective, social mechanisms are not programme 
activities or variables. Mechanisms are the underlying causal processes 
that generate change in participants, given certain conditions. Put another 
way, mechanisms focus on the way in which participants respond or react 
to programme services. A first test of the relevance and ‘validity’ of a 
programme or intervention theory can be undertaken by confronting the 
science with existing knowledge about mechanisms. 
 
Although there are not yet repositories on mechanisms, several scholars 
have provided useful summaries of the research literature on 
mechanisms. Jon Elster (2007), for example, draws on insights from 
psychology to economics and political science to identify and discuss some 
twenty mechanisms that underlie a range of social phenomena. Similarly, 
Farnsworth (2007) takes legal arrangements like laws and contracts as a 
starting point and dissects which types of mechanisms play a role when 
one wants to understand how these arrangements work. He discusses 
mechanisms such as the ‘slippery slope’, the ‘endowment effect’ and 
‘framing effects’. Theoreticians within the social sciences have also 
contributed to knowledge about mechanisms, as work by Festinger 
(1954), Merton (1968) and Olson (1971) has shown. 
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If an intervention is based on a mechanism that is known to not work well 
(in a given context), this is a signal that the programme will probably not 
be very effective. For example, Pawson (2006) demonstrates that many 
policies and programmes that appear on the surface to be very different 
actually rely on the same mechanism to change behaviour. School league 
tables, sex offender legislation, and car safety indices, for instance, can be 
conceptualised as a type of public disclosure intervention that taps into 
the same underlying mechanism (in this case, ‘naming and shaming’). 
Evidence suggests, however, that naming and shaming does not work 
particularly well in the first two contexts. Drawing on Merton’s 
celebrated reference group theory, Pawson (2010) shows that sex 
offender notification systems often lead to ‘naming and evading’, driving 
offenders underground and jeopardising public safety. Meanwhile, school 
league tables can result in ‘naming and gaming’, with administrators 
responding to ranking exercises by deploying tactics such as ‘teaching to 
the test’ in order to improve performance data. In contrast, vehicle 
companies seem to respond much more positively to naming and shaming 
efforts because they want to protect their position and reputation. 
 
Lastly, a careful examination of social science theory and research 
literature can be beneficial for guiding decisions about design and method 
options, such as the selection of constructs and variables, measurement 
techniques and analysis procedures. Prior research can inform and provide 
context for interpretation of findings, such as standards and expectations 
regarding effect sizes for particular kinds of criminal justice interventions. 
Examination of relevant evaluation studies can also help to identify the 
types of conceptual and methodological strategies that have worked well, 
or not so well in the past. Of course, careful adaption for the programme 
under investigation is likely to be required, as concepts and techniques 
may not always generalise across different contexts. Nevertheless, the 
value of drawing on extant theory to anticipate likely pitfalls and leverage 
from accumulated knowledge should not be underestimated as it can save 
evaluators and funding agencies considerable time and resources 
(Donaldson & Lipsey, 2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the 1960s, during the first boom-period in social programme evaluation, 
researchers from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds found themselves 
conducting evaluations. At this time there was virtually no theoretical 
foundation to guide practice. As we enter the second boom-period of 
evaluation, social scientists are again increasingly being called upon to 
undertake complex and often large-scale evaluations. For the many 
criminologists (and psychologists, sociologists and economists) now 
entering the field of evaluation, one of the major messages of this chapter 
is that evaluation researchers no longer need to rely so heavily on a 
‘learning-by-doing’ or ‘trial-and-error’ approach. 
 
Of course, good criminal justice evaluation is still good social science. 
Even so, history has taught us that while technical proficiency in the 
application of research methodology is important, an understanding of 
how theory can be incorporated into evaluation practice is also necessary. 
Drawing on the work of Donaldson and Lipsey (2006), this chapter has 
identified two broad types of theory and examined some of the ways in 
which these are useful for evaluation practice in criminal justice settings. 
First, theories of evaluation inform decisions regarding evaluation 
purpose, selection of data collection methods; identification of evaluator 
roles; techniques for engaging stakeholders and strategies for enhancing 
use. 
 
There is no such thing as an ideal or perfect theory of evaluation, and 
practitioners should not adhere rigidly to one approach. Knowledge of 
evaluation theory tells us how, where, when and why to deploy methods, 
given the circumstances and constraints. Learning evaluation theory is a 
professional obligation because it can help evaluators to avoid 
inadvertent, but potentially harmful practices. For example, selecting an 
evaluation approach that does not match the stage of programme 
development or adopting a managerial bias by narrowly defining the 
success of a programme according to predetermined goals and objectives. 
 
Second, theories for evaluation (i.e. programme theory and social science 
theory) help to build knowledge about social problems by identifying the 
causal mechanisms by which criminal justice programmes work (or fail to 
work). When used as an organising framework, programme theory can 
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also play a valuable role in several stages of an evaluation. During 
planning, programme theory can inform decisions about whether a 
programme is even ready to be evaluated. During evaluation design, it 
assists in determining appropriate questions and can focus the evaluation 
on critical components of the programme, saving time and resources.  
 
When evaluators collaborate with staff, seeking their input into 
programme theory development, this can enhance stakeholder 
engagement in the evaluation process and facilitate use of findings. 
When combined carefully into evaluation practice, these three forms of 
theory provide a powerful set of concepts, methods and tools for guiding 
the conduct of criminal justice evaluation and generating new knowledge 
about how, why, where and for whom criminal justice interventions work 
to ameliorate social problems.
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NOTES 
 
1. Christie (2003) suggests that this can be explained in part by the fact that many people who conduct 
evaluations have not received any formal training in evaluation and most are not evaluators; rather their 
primary identity is with some other field:  
 
today’s evaluators may not use any existing evaluation theory to guide their work…many people conducting 
evaluation rely on informal theory, derived from their experiences and ideas about evaluation…or use theories 
offered by their own professional disciplines rather than those offered by the evaluation community. (p. 2) 
2. When applied as the dominant framework for organising the conduct of an evaluation, programme theory 
could be viewed as a distinct model or theory of evaluation. Other forms of theory in evaluation that are 
sometimes distinguished include implementation theory and domain theory; although these are arguably 
subsets of social science theory. 
 
3. This is a reference to Kaplan’s (1964) ‘Law of the Instrument’ – ‘give a small boy a hammer, and he will find 
that everything he encounters needs pounding’ (p. 28). Kaplan is describing the similar tendency for 
researchers to employ their favoured methods and techniques irrespective of the nature and circumstances of 
the research task. 
 
4. The term ‘social science’ is used here in a very general sense to refer to the collective wisdom of each of the 
various substantive disciplines (e.g. history, sociology, economics, psychology, criminology, politics, biology, 
etc.). 
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